Founder note

Automic Vault.

I created Homebrew. Now I’m fixing what happens when agents use it.

Automic Vault hardens supported CLI tools on macOS and moves exposed credentials into the Keychain. You keep using your commands. You decide how much authority to give them.

Updated

Automic Vault overview showing hardened tools including Homebrew and GitHub, with AWS and Wrangler updates needing attention
The tools you’ve hardened, their recent activity, and the things that still need your attention.
Official product
automicvault.com
Platform
macOS
Source
GitHub
License
Mac app: free · Apache 2.0

Why I built it

I helped make installing tools easy.

Homebrew made it easier to get a tool onto your Mac. But after you logged in, that tool often left a token in a dotfile or a credential helper that other code running as you could read. We got used to it. Then we gave agents the terminal.

An agent can read those files and run those helpers too. Asking it nicely to leave your credentials alone doesn’t change that. And I want to use agents. I want them to do useful work without handing them every credential on my machine.

The packaging layer gives me somewhere to fix this. Automic Vault moves supported credentials into protected storage and reconfigures, wraps, or patches the tools that use them. Each protected request reaches an Authorization Gate on your Mac before the tool gets its credential. Your terminal, editor, and agent keep their usual commands.

For GitHub, start with av harden gh. It installs our signed, patched GitHub CLI and migrates its credentials. You still type gh. There’s no agent plugin to persuade your harness to use.

av harden gh

Homebrew needs a boundary too. Hardening protects /opt/homebrew from changes by other code running as you. At Read & Update, recognized inspection commands and brew update can run; installs and upgrades need your Approval. This targets Apple Silicon Homebrew, and currently means giving up services and shell completions. Read the tradeoffs.

GitHub Authorization Gate with Write Access for ChatGPT and Approval Required for all other Verified Launchers
One tool, different policies for each Verified Launcher. This example grants ChatGPT Write Access; other Verified Launchers must ask.

Same token, different authority

Reading an issue isn’t publishing a release.

I want my secrets manager to know what the secrets do. Reading GitHub, changing GitHub, and printing the token deserve different decisions.

After hardening GitHub, with a Verified Launcher set to Read Only:
CommandDecision
gh issue listAuthorized
gh issue createApproval Required
gh auth tokenApproval Required

Write Access permits recognized writes, but revealing a Secret or using an elevated credential still requires Approval. Unknown operations always require a human decision. AV verifies the live Launcher’s software identity before applying its policy; a signature establishes identity and integrity, not good intentions.

From exposure to approval

Start with what’s on your Mac.

Run a Scan to find supported credential Exposures and Hazards. Each Finding explains what AV checked and what you can change. Choose a supported Hardener, then run av doctor to verify the protection it installed. A clean Scan only covers the checks AV supports.

Detectors listing supported tools and explaining the Akamai credential check and available Hardener
See the credential path, the check, and the mitigation. Some tools have a Detector without a Hardener.
Approval for ChatGPT to run a Blessed Script, showing its declared capabilities, working directory, execution chain, and Touch ID action
Review the command and its declared capabilities before approving. Here, the Mac requires Touch ID.

Let the agent get on with it

I don’t want to approve every command either.

Policy handles recognized operations within the access you’ve chosen. For an eligible agent task, you can grant ten active minutes of Write Access at one tool’s gate. Extend it, suspend it, or end it from the visible controls. Suspending the timer suspends the authority too; disclosure and elevated credential use stay outside the grant.

For repeatable work, review a script and its declared capabilities, then bless it. A Blessed Script binds that review to its exact contents. Editing it invalidates the Blessing. I can let an agent prepare a release while giving a reviewed script the authority to publish it.

You can enable Touch ID Approval on your Mac, or send Approval requests to your iPhone. The Mac still holds the Secrets and enforces the decision. Optional iPhone Approval needs an active subscription to send allow responses; the Mac app is free. See the setup and current features.

Authorization History lets you inspect local decisions. AV records and verifies an allowed Secret Use before releasing the Secret. History has retention limits, and denial records are best effort. It isn’t a tamper-proof forensic log.

The boundary matters

I’m hardening tools, not promising a safe agent.

Protection covers supported credentials and gated operations. AV doesn’t intercept every command, sandbox the whole agent, or stop arbitrary local file changes. Once a tool receives a Secret, it can leak it. Root and kernel compromise are outside this boundary too.

Those limits matter as much as the feature list. The project’s domain definitions and architecture spell out the model. The security guide explains what it means for your setup.

Try it on your tools

Start with a Scan.

The official site has the download, a standalone scanner, and the supported Hardeners. The Automic Vault GitHub repository has the source code, releases, license, and issue tracker.

Get Automic Vault